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THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
AND THE OVERTIME ILLUSIONt
LEO KANOWITZtt
REMARKS BY PROF. LEO KANOWITZ ON
THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT.

Mr. Cook, Mr. President, last week the full Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the proposed equal rights amendment. The
most persuasive witness I had the privilege of hearing was Prof. Leo
Kanowitz of the University of New Mexico Law School who succeeded in a quite convincing fashion in refuting most of the "red
herrings" which have been raised by opponents of this amendment.
He predicted that passage of the equal rights amendment would be
a good first step toward the goal of liberation of American women
but warned that it would not be "a cure-all for the Myriad problems
of sex discrimination in law."
I urge all Senators, especially those who remain unconvinced of
the necessity for the equal rights amendment, to read the remarks of
Professor Kanowitz. I ask unanimous consent that the statement be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed
in the Record, as follows:
THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT AND THE
OVERTIME ILLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, I should first like to thank the Committee for
inviting me to state my views on the proposed equal rights amendment to the United States Constitution. As a citizen, a lawyer, and a
law professor, I have been deeply concerned for a number of years
with the status of women in the United States, or more precisely,
with the question of sex roles in our society-as this question has
come to be more accurately designated in Sweden.
Since 1965, I have studied this question to determine the role that
has and can be played with respect to it by our legal institutions. The
tReprinted from 116 Cong. Rec. 159 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1970).
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results of those studies have recently been published in my book,
Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution,I a copy of which I
have today taken the liberty of presenting to the Chairman and
Committee members.
In Women and the Law, I explore major aspects of the legal status
of American women and analyse some of the social causes and effects of sex-based discrimination in American law. Among the subjects examined are abortion, prostitution, marriageable age, age of
majority, married women's names, support obligations within the
family, divorce, special criminal penalties for women, jury service
rules, domiciles of married women, marital property regimes in the
common law and community property states, and contracts and torts
of husband and wife.
Much of the book, however, deals with the law affecting women's
employment in the United States, particular attention being paid to
the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and to the history and effects of the
prohibition against employment sex discrimination in Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In addition, Women and the Law explores
in considerable detail the principles of American constitutional law
affecting this area of human rights.
Rather than recapitulating the contents of Women and the Law, or
even its exposition and analysis of persisting sex-based discriminatory
legal rules and official practices, I would refer the Committee to the
book itself-although I am sure that many instances of such discrimination have already been brought to your attention by other
witnesses. But I would take this occasion to repeat the hopes I expressed for the book in its Preface.
"Perhaps," I wrote, "an awareness of the many areas of sex-based
legal discrimination, whose continued existence this book seeks to
identify, will stimulate, first, courtroom and legislative attacks upon
those disparities or injustices, then, a much-needed national
examination of the respective roles of the sexes in every sphere of
American life, and finally, the active and continuing participation of
all Americans in bringing about the needed changes."2
My investigation in this field has persuaded me that many irrational and harmful distinctions continue to be made in the legal,
political and social treatment of the sexes in our country, that the
resulting injustices have impeded our development as a nation, and
that they have led to much personal unhappiness for American men
as well as women.
1. Leo Kanowitz, Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution, University of New
Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 1969.
2. Id. at vii.
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By relegating women to special tasks, by perpetuating ancient
myths about the alleged physical and psychological limitations of
women, we American men have subjected ourselves to an awesome
burden. For the doubtful joys of feeling superior to women, we have
paid a terrible price. Not only have we suffered with respect to
uneven laws in the field of support obligations within the family,
child support and custody awards in divorce proceedings, and the
frequent lack of protective labor legislation where such legislation
exists for women, but our insistence that men and only men are
entitled to be society's doers and shakers has led to our dying from
eight to ten years earlier, on the average, than the women of our
country. Perhaps even more important is that, because of arbitrary
social and legal distinctions, both men and women are often prevented from relating to one another as people, as fellow members of
the human race.
So, when I speak or write of the need to erase sex-based discrimination in American law, I am moved not only by the desire to
end the injustices that American men have perpetrated upon our
nation's women, but to end those we have imposed upon ourselves as
well.
But recognizing that sex discrimination pervades American law
and that it is pernicious does not tell us how best to bring about the
needed changes. It is to this question-and specifically to whether the
constitutional amendments proposed in either Senate Joint Resolution 61 or in Senate Joint Resolution 231 are appropriate steps to
that goal-that I would now address myself.
Before I explain my reasons, however, let me state my position on
these two proposed amendments. First, I support the Equal Rights
Amendment as worded in Senate Joint Resolution 61. Secondly, I
oppose the amendments to that Amendment that are set forth in
Senate Joint Resolution 231.
Thirdly, I should also like to discuss with this Committee what I
believe is the core question in the controversy over the Amendment's
desirability namely the issue of state protective labor legislation. As I
shall explain, I believe that much of the discussion of this question is
at cross-purposes, that it proceeds from a basic fallacy in the thinking
of proponents as well as opponents, and that if it can be cleared up,
the spectacle of otherwise natural allies opposing one another may
disappear. Finally, I would be glad to try to respond to any questions
the Committee might care to ask about other aspects of this subject.
SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 61
Senate Joint Resolution 61, if adopted and ratified by the re-

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

1

quisite number of state legislatures, would add a new article to the
United States Constitution, to take effect one year after the date of
ratification. The crucial language of that proposed new article reads:
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress and
the several States shall have power, within their respective jurisdictions, to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
I have had occasion to consider the present desirability of such a
constitutional amendment in my book, Women and the Law. Writing
in 1969, I suggested that many proponents of the Equal Rights
Amendment were mistaken in their belief that the United States
Supreme Court and lower state and federal courts had in the past
held existing provisions of the United States Constitution, in particular the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, inapplicable to women.
"The fact is, however," I wrote, "that the courts have not done
this at all. Instead, they have generally held that existing constitutional provisions do apply to women, but that within the limits of
those provisions, women in many situations constitute
a class that
3
can reasonably be subjected to separate treatment."
I also suggested that the adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment
would not fundamentally change the picture. "While the proposed
amendment states that equality of rights shall not be abridged on
account of sex," I wrote "sex classifications could continue if it can
be demonstrated that though they are expressed in terms of sex, they
are in reality based upon function. On the other hand, under existing
constitutional provisions, particular classifications of men and
women that cannot be shown to be based upon function, are vulnerable to attack-as has already been demonstrated in some lower state
and federal courts with respect to discriminatory laws in the realm of
jury service, differences in punishment 4for identical crimes, right to
sue for loss of consortium and the like."
This latter reference was to a series of recent cases in which sexbased discriminatory legal rules had already been struck down by
various courts as violating the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. (E.g., White v. Crook,
251 F. Supp. 401 (1966);Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (1968);
Owen v. Illinois Baking Corporation, 260 F. Supp. 820 (D.C. Mich
1966); Clem v. Brown, 3 Ohio Misc. 167, 207, N.E. 2d 398 (1965)
etc.)
I also suggested that "as some of these cases make their way to the
Supreme Court, the Court, influenced by the reasoning of the
3. Id. at 195.
4. Id.
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opinions below and perhpas more responsive to the present sociological climate surrounding he question -of women's legal status than
it has been in the past, may drastically revise its prior approach to
determining the kind and extent of official sex discrimination that is
allowable."
I continue to hold these views. I believe that there is a very high
degree of probability that the United States Supreme Court, when it
next confronts an equal protection or due process challenge to a sex
discriminatory law, will drastically modify the undifferentiated
principle originally enuciated in the 1908 case of Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908) that "Sex is a valid basis for classification."...a principle I described in Women and the Law as being "often

repeated mechanically by the courts without regard to the purposes
of the statute in question or the reasonableness of the relationship
between that purpose and the sex-based classification," ' Indeed, I
suggested, "[t Ihe subsequent reliance in judicial decisions upon the
Muller language is a classic example of the misuse of precedent, of
later courts being mesmerized by what an earlier court had said
rather than what it had done. "6
But if I believe that the Equal Rights Amendment would not
achieve anything that could not be achieved by the courts in interpreting existing constitutional provisions, the question arises as to
why I am supporting the Equal Rights Amendment at this time,
especially since my position on the Amendment has heretofore
wavered between mild opposition and lukewarm support. The answer
is simple. Although I still believe that there is a very high degree of
probability that the Supreme Court will perform as I hope and
expect in this area, there is no guarantee that it will do so. Moreover,
I now believe that it is necessary for all branches of government to
demonstrate an unshakeable intention to eliminate every last vestige
of sex-based discrimination in American law. The adoption of the
Equal Rights Amendment at this time would give encouragement to
the many American women and men who now see the need for
substantial reform in this area. Finally, should the next few years
bear out my prediction that the Court will soon begin to interpret
existing constitutional provisions so as to eliminate irrational sex
discrimination in the law, no harm will have been achieved by the
presence of the Equal Rights Amendment. Indeed, many examples
can be cited in which laws and official practices may violate more
than one constitutional provision at one time.
Moreover, should the Supreme Court not respond as I have sug5. Id. at 154.
6. Id.
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gested it ought to in this area, then the need for the Equal Rights
Amendment will have become manifest. The time that will have been
gained by sending it on its ratification road immediately would be
precious.
There is one word of caution I would add at this point, however.
This Committee and Congress, if it adopts the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment as I hope it will do, will make sure that the record
discloses that it does not thereby intend to discourage the United
States Supreme Court from interpreting existing constitutional provisions-and especially the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment-so as to eliminate every sex-based discrimination in
American law that cannot be sustained by overwhelming proof of
functional differences between men and women.
I say this because there is a very real danger that if this is not
done, the adoption of the Amendment at this time will ultimately
represent a defeat rather than a victory for those of us who seek the
eradication of irrational sex-based distinctions in American law and
society. In the absence of such a clarifying declaration in the legislative history the Court, when faced with an equal protection or due
process challenge to a sex-discriminatory legal rule or official practice
within the next few years, may be prompted to reason as follows:
Since a coordinate branch of the federal government, the Congress,
has deemed it necessary to adopt the Equal Rights Amendment, then
it must have believed that existing constitutional provisions were
inadequate to provide the needed relief in this area. Though such a
view is not determinative, it is at least persuasive. As a result, deferring to Congress' apparent wishes in this respect, the Court could
withhold any modification of the Muller principle and simply await
the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment before providing the
needed relief in this area.
The problem of course is that one cannot be sure that the Equal
Rights Amendment will be ratified by the requisite number of State
legislatures. Even if it is eventually ratified, this may occur many
years from now. In the meantime, many litigants, both men and
women, seeking to prevent unreasonable discrimination based upon
sex, may find that no redress is available from the courts.
I am aware of course of the decision in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368, wherein the Supreme Court at page 379, invoked the Fifteenth
Amendment's prohibition against voting denials based on race and
the Nineteenth Amendment's similar prohibition of denials based on
sex to sustain a challenge to a county-unit voting system that was
based on the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Gray
v. Sanders is no guarantee however that the Court would act the
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same way under the circumstances we are presently concerned with.
For one thing, Gray was decided after the ratification of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, while the fear that I have expressed concerns the Supreme Court's response while the ratification
of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment would still be pending.
For another thing, the Gray decision did not require the Court to
overrule or substantially modify any of its recent decisions. But if
the Court were to do as I hope and expect it will with respect to
equal protection and due process challenges to sex-based legal discrimination, it would have to drastically modify several decisions
that were rendered as recently as 1961 (Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S.
57) and 1954 (Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464).
For these reasons, I believe it is of crucial importance that this
Committee and Congress, in adopting the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment, make clear their hope and expectation that forthcoming decisions of the United States Supreme Court will soon transform that Amendment into a constitutional redundancy.
Finally, before moving on to the proposed amendments to the
Amendment that are contained in S.J. Res. 231, let me make one
more observation.
Some proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment are undoubtedly convinced that its adoption will inevitably revolutionize
judicial attitudes about sex roles in our society. Some opponents of
the Amendment are equally convinced that its adoption will introduce chaos, uncertainty and confusion in our law and judicial
processes.
My most recent studies in this area have persuaded me that neither
view is correct. I have just returned from a seven-month sabbatical
leave in Europe. While there, I began an examination of law-based
sex discrimination problems in France, West Germany, Switzerland,
England, Denmark, and Sweden.
My study is still incomplete and it shall be some time before I shall
be able to publish my conclusions. For the moment, however, I think
I can say with some assurance that the experience of the West German courts in interpreting a similar constitutional provision
("Manner und Fraunen sind gleichberechtigt,"-translated as "Men
and women are equal before the law." Art. 3, sec. 2 Constitution of
the German Federal Republic) demonstrates two important points.
One is that our Courts will face no extraordinary difficulties in dealing with the Amendment. The other is that the Amendment will not
of itself represent a cure-all for the myriad problems of sex discrimination in law and society- although it will be a step in the right
direction. For as I suggested in Women and the Law, even after the
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adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment, "the crucial factor will
continue to be the responsiveness of the judiciary to the social im7
pulse toward equality of treatment without regard to sex."
But in contrast to my former position, when I believed that, for
tactical reasons, efforts to secure passage of the Amendment ought
to be abated in favor of vigorous challenges under existing constitutional provisions, I now believe, for the reasons advanced earlier in
these remarks, that, provided the adequate legislative history is made,
passage of the Amendment at this time could do no harm and possibly could do much good.
SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 231
Let me now turn my attention to Senate Joint Resolution 231.
That Joint Resolution, introduced as a substitute to Senate Joint
Resolution 61, would change the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
in several respects. First, it would place a seven-year limitation on the
ratification process. Secondly, it would become effective two years
after ratification rather than one year after ratification as proposed
in S.J. Res. 61. But most importantly, it would qualify the basic
declaration of equality contained in S.J. Res. 61 by adding this
second sentence:
This article shall not impair, however, the validity of any law of
the United States or any state which exempts women from compulsory military service or which is reasonably designed to promote
the health, safety, privacy, education, or economic welfare of
women, or to enable them to perform their duties as homemakers or
mothers.
As indicated earlier, I recommend the rejection of S.J. Res. 231.
First of all, I oppose the seven year limitation on the ratification
process. Hopefully, the basic Equal Rights Amendment, as worded in
S.J. Res. 61, will be ratified long before seven years have passed. But
should that not be the case, I can see nothing that will be gained by
imposing such a time limit-especially if, as I have suggested, the
legislative history will clearly show Congress' hope and expectation
that the Supreme Court will in the meantime render the Amendment
unnecessary.
Second, while there is some merit to the idea that the State legislatures and Congress should be given more than one year to enact
appropriate implementing legislation, a one year period would be
adequate since both state and federal legislatures would have had
7. Id. at 195.
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time to prepare for their work while the ratification process was still
pending.
My most severe reservations about S.J. Res. 231, however, go to
the language in the second sentence of the first section that would
qualify the basic declaration in favor of equal treatment in the law
without regard to sex that is contained in the first sentence of that
section.
I suggest that there are serious questions about the meaning of the
second sentence. And even if the meaning of it can be ascertained, I
fear that the interpretation probably intended by its sponsor would
render that language objectionable to me as being incompatible with
the needs of our society and the basic goal of equal treatment under
law without regard to sex.
In ascertaining the meaning of the second sentence, I think it is
important to note first the provision that it qualifies. That provision
states, "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."
Then comes the sentence in question which states that the Article
shall not impair the validity of certain kinds of laws which presently
are assumed to benefit women in a variety of ways.
One possible interpretation, resulting from this juxtaposition of
the two sentences, would be as follows: Since the first sentence
guarantees equality of treatment without regard to sex, and since the
benefits presumably flowing to women from certain laws are held
inviolate in the second sentence, then the only way to achieve the
equality of treatment guaranteed in the first sentence is to extend
those benefits to men. Under this construction, since women's
present exemption from compulsory military services is to be preserved, the constitutional command of equal treatment can be
obeyed only by extending the exemption to men. This would render
unconstitutional our present Selective Service law which presently
applies to men only.
While, personally, I would have no objection to such a construction of this language, I wonder if this would be acceptable to the
Resolution's sponsor.
A similar analysis can be offered of the remaining language of the
second sentence, i.e., up to the beginning of the last clause. For, it is
not only women who have an interest in laws designed to promote
their health, safety, privacy, education or economic welfare. Men are
equally interested in being protected by government in these areas. A
reasonable reconciliation of this language with the command of the
first sentence would be to read it as requiring the extension of the
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benefits of such laws to men. Indeed, if this is intended by this
language, I could support it-although, as I will explain, the Equal
Rights Amendment, as worded in S.J. Res. 61, achieves this same
goal and is preferable.
The last clause of the second sentence raises some difficulties,
however. It states, "or to enable them to perform their duties as
homemakers or mothers." Here the extension approach is clearly not
intended. Though it is possible to think of men performing the
function of homemakers, it is a little difficult to conceive of them as
mothers in a biological sense. Moreover, this last clause would appear
to lend constitutional dignity to the social presumption that the
highest, if not the sole, life's work for women is that of wife and
mother.
The apparent intention of this last clause provides a key, I believe,
to the probable meaning and intention of the rest of the language in
the second sentence. That is, rather than intending these benefits and
protections to be extended to men, the Amendment's sponsor apparently intends, by the language of the second sentence, to preserve
these for women alone. Not only would this represent a nullification
of the spirit and intent of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment as
worded in S.J. Res. 61, but it would be a substantial step backward
from the encouraging recent trend of decisions in the state courts
and lower federal courts.
Even if S.J. Res. 231 is intended to embrace the possibility of
extending to men certain rights, privileges and benefits of law presently enjoyed by women only, the basic fallacy in its reasoning is its
apparent assumption that the unadorned Equal Rights Amendment,
as worded in S.J. Res. 61, would, if adopted and ratified, deprive
women of many of these rights, privileges, and benefits.
But I suggest that this need not happen at all. In Women and the
Law, I pointed out how it would be consistent with judicial
precedent for the courts, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause in sex discrimination cases, to cure
the invalid inequality by extending the benefits of particular laws to
the sex (male or female) that had not previously enjoyed those benefits rather than by removing them from the one that had. That
analysis, I suggested, was equally applicable with respect to the Equal
Rights Amendment.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968), I wrote had "held that a denial to illegitimate children of a right to recover for wrongful death of their mother, where
her legitimate children could recover the same wrong, violated the
equal protection guarantee. But the Court's remedy for such a viola-
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tion was not to remove from the legitimate children the right to
recover for their mother's wrongful death, but rather to extend this
right to her illegitimate children." 8
"Even some state courts," I observed, "exercising their power to
entertain federal constitutional challenges to state laws, have
achieved similar results. Thus, in Clem v. Brown, an Ohio Court of
Common Pleas, holding that the state's rule permitting husbands but
not wives to recover for loss of consortium deprives a wife of 'equal
protection of the law' remedied this inequality by extending the
right to wives rather than by removing it from husbands. Similarly,
the decision of a federal district court in Michigan in Owen v. Illinois
Baking Corporation was one more example of a... court curing
what it regarded as a constitutionally infirm one-way consortium rule
by extending the right to sue to married women.
"As long ago as 1871, the United States Supreme Court held that
a state could not limit the right to sue on a cause of action created
under state law so as to deprive the federal courts of the power to
entertain such suits if jurisdiction was otherwise present ... Though
[the] result.., was dictated by the requirements of Article III of
the U.S. Constitution, conferring the Judicial Power upon the United
States, rather than by the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment, it is another illustration of the Court's past practice of
implementing constitutional provisions by extending a state-created
benefit beyond the limits intended by the state, while recognizing
that the state could, if it wanted, remove the benefit from all." 9
This, I believe, is the spirit in which the Supreme Court, aided by
the legislative history, will interpret the Equal Rights Amendment as
worded in S.J. Res. 61. This, I believe, is the spirit in which the
Court can and should interpret the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause in forthcoming sex discrimination cases.
I would also stress that the Amendment as worded in S.J. Res. 61
empowers Congress and the States, within their respective jurisdictions, to enforce the new article by appropriate legislation. This, I
suggest, is the ultimate corrective, the ultimate guarantee of social
consensus with regard to decisions to extend one-way rules or
abrogate them.
In sum, I believe that S.J. Res. 231 is based on an invalid assumption as to the probable effects of the Equal Rights Amendment
as worded in S.J. Res. 61, and therefore recommend its rejection.
Though I am absolutely certain that the sponsor of S.J. Res. 231 is as
interested as I am in advancing the status of American women in law
8. Id. at 186.
9. Id. at 186-187.
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and society, he has proposed a way that I simply cannot support.
The fact of the matter is that this is an extraordinarily difficult
question about which reasonable men and women do differ. My hope
is that, in the course of these hearings, understanding of all of us will
be advanced, and that the ultimate decision is the right one.
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT, PROTECTIVE LABOR
LAWS, AND THE OVERTIME ILLUSION
Finally, I should like to turn my attention to how the Equal
Rights Amendment, if adopted, could work in the area that has been
the subject of greatest controversy. I am referring specifically to the
Amendment's effect upon the State's protective labor laws that presently apply to women only. Parenthetically, I would point out that
my analysis here also applies to the effects of the equal protection
clause, if and when the Supreme Court begins to interpret that clause
vigorously in the sex discrimination area.
Reading the testimony presented to this Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments during its earlier hearings this
year, and the testimony presented at prior Senate committee hearings on the proposed Amendment, I am struck by what I regard as a
peculiar fact. That fact is that certain groups or organizations that,
according to all reasonable expectations, should be allied on the issue
of equality without regard to sex are in fact divided over the desirability of the Amendment as a way of achieving that goal. I am of
course speaking of the basic division between the women's organizations, who have for the most part supported the Amendment and
organized labor which has, for the most part, opposed it.
By and large, representatives of organized labor have expressed a
fear that, should the Amendment become part of our fundamental
law, many of the protections that have been won for women workers
over years of difficult struggle would be nullified. On the other hand,
some supporters of the Amendment have expressed a suspicion that
labor's principal motive in opposing it is to monopolize for men both
jobs and other supposed benefits, which I shall soon discuss. Though
this suspicion is understandable if we recall longstanding collective
bargaining agreements providing substantial sex-based wage differentials for the same or similar jobs, it is not, in my opinion, an
accurate reading of the motives of the Amendment's trade union
opponents.
In Women and the Law, I quoted a 1964 statement by Congresswoman Martha Griffiths of Michigan which not only characterized
organized labor's basic attitude in this area, but also pointed the way
to what I believe is the ultimate solution to its knotty problems.
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"Some people," said Congresswoman Griffiths, "have suggested to
me that labor opposes 'no discrimination on account of sex' because
they feel that through the years protective legislation has been built
up to safeguard the health of women. Some legislation was to safeguard the health of women, but it should have safeguarded the health
of men, also."' 0
Basing my analysis upon the same principle, I suggested in Women
and the Law how this could be done. Specifically, I demonstrated
how, consistently with what had already been done in administrative
and constitutional law decision, the equality of treatment required in
this area could be achieved by extending protective laws to men
rather than by removing them from women. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, I suggested, should pursue this approach
in administering the anti-sex-discrimination provisions of Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In areas that were beyond the jurisdictional reach of the EEOC, I urged reliance upon past judicial
precedents such as those I have just referred to in my discussion of
S.J. Res. 231, to achieve the same extension of those laws rather
than their abrogation.
This analysis, I still believe, is a sound one. Not only has the Labor
Department, in administering the Equal Pay Act of 1963, determined
that where state law provides a minimum wage for women only, the
Equal Pay Act entitles men in that state to the same minimum wage
if they are covered by the federal law, but the EEOC also has taken
the position that the benefits of state laws, presently applicable to
women only-such as those requiring minimum wages, rest periods,
seats at work-are required by Title VII to be extended to men. Even
in those situations that are beyond the jurisdictional reach of Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act, I suggested, the judicial extension technique employed in equal protection and other constitutional cases,
could lead to the same results.
Moreover, these results can also be achieved under the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment-especially if the legislative history disclosed that Congress intends this. The fears of some opponents of the
Amendment that its adoption would nullify laws that presently protect women only is thus unfounded-since the equality of treatment
required by the Amendment can be achieved by extending the benefits of those laws to men rather than removing them from women.
Moreover, the failure of any court to do this can be corrected
through the legislative process.
Thus, as I stated in a recent article in the Family Law Quarterly
10. Id. at 100.
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the current renewed concern with the legal status of women will in
many respects result in improving the situation of men as well as
women. Just as breakthroughs in the legal status of American blacks
has benefitted other racial and ethinic 'minorities,' so the effort to
provide women with equal employment opportunity can substantially improve the situation of male employees in industry and
commerce.11

But the problem does not stop there. Essentially, I have been
discussing the fate of certain protective labor laws-minimum wages,
rest periods, seats at work-about which there can be little doubt
that they provide valuable protections and benefits not only worth
preserving for women but also worth extending to men.
But the major source of controversy concerns two types of state
protective labor laws, presently applicable to women only, about
which there is much confusion as to whether they in fact represent a
burden or benefit. I am referring now to those state laws limiting the
weights that women are permitted to lift or carry in industry, or
restricting the number of hours that women may work in a day or a
week.
It is with respect to these two types of laws that the extension
approach begins to run into trouble. For if a state's weight-lifting
limitations, presently applicable to women only, were extended to
men, then, as I suggested in Women and the Law, "it would simply
mean that certain objects would not get lifted in the course of that
state's industrial life," 1 2 hardly a tolerable result. As for the extension of hours limitations laws, this would raise problems of another
order-which I shall discuss in a moment.
Recognizing that the extension approach was not feasible in the
weight-lifting area, I suggested an alternative solution. That solution
was to reconcile such laws with either Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act or with a constitutional requirement of equal legal treatment without regard to sex by holding that a state's weight-lifting
limit for women workers.

.

. "merely creates a burden of proof and

of persuasion in individual women applicants to show that they can
perform the work in question without harmful effects, though such
work requires occasional lifting of weights in excess of those permitted by the rule. That burden could be satisfied by a certificate
'
from a family physician or some other testing procedures."'
I now believe that this alternative solution was faulty in that it did
11. Kanowitz, Women and the Law: A Reply To Some of the Commentators, 4 FAM.
L.Q. 19, 29 (1970).
12. Kanowitz, Women and the Law at 183.
13. Id. at 116-117.
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not in fact conform to the equality principle, since the burden of
proof and persuasion that I had proposed was applicable only to
women and not to men.
A more acceptable solution, which cannot be achieved judicially
but requires legislative action, is the replacement of such state
statutes by others, such as the one now in force in Georgia that
protects both men and women workers from being required to lift
weights that could cause "strains or undue fatigue." Such a law
implicitly recognizes that many individual women can, without
harm, lift weights in excess of the limits previously imposed by state
law, and that many individual men cannot. Thus, under the new law,
people-both men and women-are protected against being required
to lift weights that are excessive for them. At the same time, no
artificial sex-based distinction, having the effect of depriving one sex
of equal employment opportunities, is maintained.
I repeat, therefore, that with regard to state weight-lifting statutes
presently applicable to women workers only, equality of treatment
without regard to sex can be achieved by adopting the type of
statute I have just cited.
But now let us consider what I think is the nub of the ideological
controversy over the desirability of the Equal Rights Amendment.
And that is the question of how the Amendment would affect those
state laws which presently provide penalties for employers who permit or require their women employees to work in excess of a given
number of hours in a day or in a week. Were such laws extended to
cover male employees it would not, as in the case of extending
weight-lifting restrictions, bring industry to a grinding halt, although
it would create some dislocation and expense for management. But
the fundamental difficulty in extending such laws to cover male
employees is that, because of what I consider organized labor's
failure to educate its membership about the problems of overtime
work, it would be regarded by many male workers as the imposition
of a burden and not a boon. Stated differently, were employers
penalized for permitting or requiring their male workers to work
overtime hours, many of those male workers would, in the present
economic situation, regard this as a deprivation of their right to earn
what they consider premium wages and not as the extension to them
of a protection presently applicable to women.
Indeed, many women workers undoubtedly look upon the opportunity to work overtime from the same perspective. This, I suggest,
explains much that has happened in the last few years in this area. It
explains for example why all Title VII suits in the hours area have
been brought by women workers seeking to invalidate state hours-
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limitation laws presently applying for women only. By doing so, they
argue, they would, like men, be able to earn attractive overtime pay.
Moreover, the elimination of the sex-based distinction in this area
would also eliminate the inequality of job opportunity it creates. For
many an employer has refused to hire or promote a woman employee for a job in states limiting women's working hours, claiming
that the job in question often requires overtime work. This also
explains, I suggest, the position taken by the EEOC in this area in
seeking to invalidate such women-only hours-limitation laws in the
states where they exist. And it explains why some states have been
persuaded to repeal such laws in the past few years.
This entire trend, I submit, is deplorable and mistaken. It is simply
the wrong way to achieve the desired equality of legal treatment and
equality of job opportunity. It is a step backward from sensible
policies toward overtime work.
"[WI ith victories like these," I wrote in a recent article, "women
don't need many defeats. For success in these efforts not only removes limitations upon women's right to work extra hours ...but
also means that those women who do not wish to... work excessive
hours-and I would suggest that they are many if not in the
1
majority-can henceforth be forcee to do so."'"
The consternation these developments provoke in the breasts of
trade union opponents of the Amendment is indeed understandable.
But I submit that labor's own record with respect to overtime policy
accounts for much of this trend. For the labor movement has permitted American workers to be lulled into a false sense of economic
security by the overtime illusion-the feeling that they can attain
their desired standard of living by working extra hours.
As I pointed out in Women and the Law, it is not uncommon for
many workers to "work 48, 58, and perhaps 68 hours in a given
week-a situation not unlike that prevailing at the turn of the century when organized labor was struggling to reduce the 12-hour,
6-day week to a 10-hour, 6-day week."' ' I also suggested that the
requirements of time and one-half pay for overtime work under state
and federal laws "were not enacted to reward workers for their willingness to work excess hours. Rather, they were designed to deter
employers from requiring their employees to work such hours. The
overtime rates provided for by such laws, rather than being
denominated as premium rates, are therefore probably more accurately described as penalty rates, when they are viewed from the
perspective of their intended objects-employers as a class. For the
14. Kanowitz, supra note 11 at 28.
15. Kanowitz, Women and the Law at 125.
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idea behind such provisions was that employers, faced with the
prospect of having to pay one and a half times as much for each
excess hour of nonovertime work, would pause before requiring their
employees to work such hours."' 6
But this legislative policy aimed at deterring overtime work has
been distorted by certain economic facts. For one thing, as I noted in
the book, "Many employers have found that it is often more economical to pay experienced workers a premium (penalty?) rate than
to engage the services of inexperienced workers at straight-time rates
(and to whom new fringe benefits would have to be paid) to complete a job at hand."' ' For another, I would now add that many
American workers have grown to depend upon overtime work as a
means of making ends meet or to improve their basic standard of
living-an attitude that may make it easier to lead a trade union than
if it didn't exist, but which makes little social sense.
That excess working hours for both sexes has for a long time been
regarded as a social evil to be cured by legislation can be seen in the
experience of New York at the turn of the century. But New York's
efforts to place a ten-hour limit on the working hours of bakery
employees of both sexes was rebuffed in 1905 by the Supreme Court
in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), because of its then
existing notions of due process and liberty of contract. Three years
later, however, the Court in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908),
upheld Oregon's maximum hours law for women only. As I suggested
in Women and the Law, this sequence of judicial decisions led many
states to enact hours limitations laws for women only on the theory
that half a loaf was better than none-even though the Court's later
decisions made it abundantly clear that the Lochner case would be
decided differently today.
The combination of these factors suggests that it would be consistent with our nation's traditional policy toward overtime work to
achieve equality of legal treatment for both sexes in the hours area
by extending hours-limitations laws to men rather than by removing
them from women. Among other things, such a step would provide
protection for many male workers who, for a variety of reasons,
prefer not to work overtime but whose refusal to do so today constitutes, even under many collective bargaining agreements, a cause
for discharge.
For these reasons, I suggested in Women and the Law that the
extension approach could be utilized in the hours-limitations field.
Were this to be done, the fears of some labor opponents of the Equal
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Rights Amendment that these protections for women would be
nullified would be without foundation. For not only would women
retain this protection, but it would be extended to men as well.
But economic realities and the overtime illusion have not left us
with an entirely free hand in this area. As a compromise, therefore,
one designed to implement the principle of equal treatment and
equality of job opportunity, I suggested the possibility of enacting
on a wide scale state statutes that would embody the principle of
voluntary overtime. "Such legislation," I wrote, "would permit both
men and women to work a designated number of hours in excess of
an established norm, but would provide that no employer subject to
to discharge any employee
the coverage of the law would be allowed
1
for his or her refusal to work overtime." 8
The path that is ultimately taken depends on many factors. But
the point that I would stress is that the claim that the Equal Rights
Amendment would nullify state protective laws in the hourslimitations area is unfounded. As I have explained, there are several
ways in which the right not to work overtime-which, after all, is at
the heart of the hours-limitation laws for women only-can not only
be preserved for women, but can be made equally available to men.
Above all, it is important for organized labor to begin to re-assess its
overtime work policies. When that is done, the claim of many of us
that the liberation of American women will lead to the liberation of
American men as well will be understood for the truth that it is.

18. Id. at 126.

